State v. Cramer, 299 P.3d 756 (Haw. 2013)

Trial court abused its discretion in not allowing substitution of counsel at sentencing hearing after termination from drug court.

Gross v. State of Maine, Superior Court case # CR-11-4805 (2/26/13)

Drug court procedures relating to termination violative of due process and, therefore, unconstitutional.  Drug Court participant entitled to: notice of the termination allegations and the evidence against him, right to call and x-examine witnesses, a hearing at which he is present, a neutral magistrate, written factual findings and the right to counsel.  Here, the drug court team discussed the termination decision during the termination hearing, without defendant’s presence or that of his counsel.  That procedure coupled by the fact the Superior Court felt that the drug court judge should have recused, resulted in a finding of constitutional infirmity.  Moreover, the appellate court ruled the defendant did not, arguably could not prospectively waive his rights, citing LaPlaca and Staley.

Rothegery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008)

A criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a magistrate judge, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Attachment does not also require that a prosecutor (as distinct from a police officer) be aware of that initial proceeding or involved in its conduct.

DeMillard v. State, 190 P.3d 128, 128 (Wyo. 2008)

Probation modification proceedings not critical stage of proceedings and therefore no right to counsel.

Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 2379 (2008)

Hholding that a court may deny a person the right to self representation due to mental illness, even when the court finds that the person is competent to stand trial.

State v. Kouba, 709 N.W.2d 299, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)

A modification of the terms of probation is a critical stage of the proceedings, where the right to counsel attaches, at least where the modification adds significant terms to probation.

Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004)

Searching inquiry before allowing waiver of counsel.

Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2004)

Defendant who has waived his right to counsel may nonetheless re-assert that right.

State v. Thomas, 659 N.W.2d 217, 217 (Iowa 2003)

Sentencing hearing is a critical stage of the proceeding and counsel should be present, absent a waiver.

Dunson v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 847, 847 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)

Concluding that defendant’s assertions that he was denied counsel were unfounded because he was never without counsel at any critical stage of the proceedings.

State v. Sommer, 878 P.2d 1007, 1008 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)

A modification of the terms of probation is a critical stage of the proceedings, where the right to counsel attaches, at least where the modification adds significant terms to probation.

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977)

Right to counsel attaches at every critical stage of the proceedings, after initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 822 (1975).

Individual generally has the right to represent him/her self.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973)

Probation and parole revocation proceedings are not considered a critical stage under the federal constitution.  But every state requires counsel at probation revocation proceedings if the defendant so requests.

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972)

Right to counsel extends to all felony prosecutions and to misdemeanor prosecutions where incarceration is actually imposed.

Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 128 (1967)

Sentencing hearing is a critical stage of the proceeding and counsel should be present, absent a waiver.