Lawrence v. State (Ala. Court of Criminal Appeals 2023)

Record indicates that Lawrence was not provided proper written notice of the modification of his probation to include this specific condition. “The circuit court abused its discretion by revoking Lawrence’s probation for his failure to complete a 12-month residential rehabilitation program when the record indicates that Lawrence was not provided proper written notice of the modification of his probation to include this specific condition.”

State v. Hunt, 476 P. 3d 530 – Or: Court of Appeals 2020

Differentiating between sanctions in drug and modification of the terms of probation—finding statutorily that probation violation fee is a sanction, modifying community service is a sanction and a weekend in jail was a sanction.

Brookman v. State, Md: Court of Special Appeals 2017

Sanctions imposed reversed and remanded for a hearing. Defendants wanted to contest sanctions imposed without a hearing for low creatinine results and failure to appear for a drug test. Court held it was a due process violation to not accord an adversarial hearing, including the right to counsel, the ability to call witnesses and a continuance, if necessary for preparation.

Taylor v. State, CR-15-0354 (Ala. Crim. App. 9/9/16)

Sanctioning hearing using hearsay not due process violation. Concurrence: I realize that developing specific procedures for handling drug-court sanctions can be an arduous task — especially given the dearth of case law in this State addressing drug-court programs. I would encourage other drug-court judges in this State either to use or to develop a drug-court-sanction procedure similar to the one outlined in this Court’s opinion (ie: provision of a hearing). I would also recommend to other drug-court professionals that they take advantage of the vast training resources and educational opportunities available through the National Association of Drug Court Professionals.

Kemper v. State, Ind: No. 82A01-1508-CR-1104.(Court of Appeals 2016)

Not Selected for Publication (In an appeal of a drug court’s imposition of a sanctions that the defendant thought were too harsh, the appellate court stated: Drug Court is a forensic diversion program akin to community corrections and probation. Withers v. State, 15 N.E.3d 660, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Accordingly, we review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for Drug Court violations for an abuse of discretion. Id. We will find an abuse of discretion only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.

Hoffman v. Jacobi (S.D. Ind., 9/29/2015)

Magistrate Judge recommends class certification on 42 USC §1983 damages and injunctive relief suit against Drug Court Judge and team for incarcerating participants for lengthy periods of time, while awaiting placement in drug treatment facilities. Plaintiffs allege that the decision to hold them in jail pending placement was made without counsel, hearing, consideration of bond, or other rights of due process.

Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Thompson, ____Miss. ___, (Miss Supreme Court 5/21/2015)

Drug Court Judge removed from office for, inter alia, sanctioning individuals to jail without according due process of hearing. Judge Thompson’s conduct of depriving participants in drug court of their due-process rights when he signed orders of contempt without the persons being properly notified of the charge of contempt or a right to a hearing, and by conducting “hearings” immediately after “staffing meetings” without adequate time for the persons to have proper counsel or evidence presented, violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(1), 3B(2), 3B(4), 3B(8), and constitutes willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

Hoffman v. Jacobi, 4:14-cv-00012-SEB-TAB. (S.D. Ind. 10-17-2014)

Denying a motion to dismiss lawsuit against a former Drug Court Judge, who was alleged to have incarcerated drug court participants for lengthy periods without due process of law. Even though the drug court has been discontinued, the federal district court did not find the matter moot nor subject to the Younger (Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37(1971) abstention doctrine, even though it involved the administration of another court.

Paley v. The Second Judicial District Court, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 74 (2013)

Absent evidence of conduct that actually disrupts the court proceeding, a positive out-of-court drug test is not a sufficient basis for holding a party in contempt of court because no contemptuous conduct occurs in the “immediate view and presence” of the judge.

In the Interest of C.K., Case No. 2 D12-633,District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District (Opinion filed May 4, 2012)

Failure to give notice of FDTC hearing which limited parental contact was a due process violation.

Commonwealth v. Nicely, 2009-SC-000313-DG (Ky. 11-18-2010)

“The dissent also expresses concern that a drug court sanction cannot be a modification of probation because the elements of due process normally accorded a defendant at a probation revocation hearing are not followed. For example, the defendant appearing before the drug court judge usually does not have counsel. However, defendants who enter drug court waive those rights while in the program, and upon discharge from the program, the defendant retains all those rights at any revocation hearing that follows.”

State v. Stewart, (Tenn. Crim. App. 8-18-2010)

Not Selected for Official Publication) (Having reviewed the record, we are additionally troubled by the four or five occasions where the defendant in this case was “sanctioned” to significant jail time by the drug court team during the two years he participated in the program. Leaving aside (as we must) the obvious due process concerns attendant to any additional deprivation of the defendant’s liberty that has been imposed through a collaborative, non-adversarial, and at times ex parte process rather than through a traditional adversarial evidentiary hearing, there is considerable tension between this outcome and the general guidelines under which drug courts should operate. The drug court program explicitly recognizes that alcohol and drug addition “is a chronic, relapsing condition,” that “many participants [will] exhibit a pattern of positive urine tests,” and expressly contemplates that many participants will experience periods of relapse “[e]ven after a period of sustained abstinence.”

Tyler T., 279 Neb. 806, 806 (2010)

Given the therapeutic component of problem-solving-court programs, we are not prepared to say that each and every action taken in such a proceeding must be a matter of record. But we have no difficulty in concluding that when a judge of a problem-solving court conducts a hearing and enters an order affecting the terms of the juvenile’s probation, the proceeding must be on the record. We agree with other courts which have held that where a liberty interest is implicated in problem-solving-court proceedings, an individual’s due process rights must be respected.

Walker v. Lamberti, 29 So. 3d 1172, 1172

Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a defendant who voluntarily agreed to participate in drug court cannot subsequently opt out to avoid jail–based drug treatment program.

Thorne v. Hale, No. 1:08cv601 (JCC), 2009 WL 980136 (E.D. Va. Mar. 26, 2009) aff’d, Thorne v. Hale, No. 09-2305, WL1018048 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2010)

Claimant was unsuccessful because of procedural requirements and absolute judicial immunity. However, the federal court makes staffings and the sanctioning process sound like a Star Chamber: “Thorne claims that, during the ‘sanctions’ hearings that followed his failure to adhere to the drug court’s rules, the allegations against him, the testimony of witnesses, and the presentation of evidence violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Testimony, he asserts, was “made in secrete [sic] between the Drug Court and RACSB administrators, {Defendants Kelly Hale, Judith Alston and Sharon Gillian},” the RACSB, the Commonwealth’s Attorney, and the state court judge, “to include whispered testimony to the presiding Judge at the bench, so as to exclude Plaintiff . . . from all measures of defense and redress commensurate with Due and Compulsory Process of Law.”

State v. Rogers, 170 P.3d 881, 881 (Idaho 2007)

Holding that termination hearings are required in drug courts, at least where defendant pled guilty and his was sentence deferred, but also noting in dicta that such requirements are not required when sanctions are imposed.

Mullin v. Jenne, 890 So. 2d 543, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

Holding that jail can be used as a sanction for defendants who choose to remain in voluntary program.

T.N. v. Portesy, 932 So. 2d 267, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 2005)

Holding that a court cannot impose sanctions beyond those authorized by statute, even if agreed to by the juvenile drug court participant upon entry into program.

Diaz v. State, 884 So. 2d 299, 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

Holding that jail cannot be used as a sanction in a pre-plea contractual drug court program because not authorized by statute.

Miguel, 63 P.3d 1065, 1065 (Ariz. App. 2003).

Appellate Court appeared require a hearing when the juvenile defendants raised the due process issue and the possibility of jail or detention sanctions at a review hearing.

Staley v. State, 851 So. 2d 805, 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

Concluding that waiver of hearing rights in a drug court contract impugns the integrity of the justice system and undermines public confidence in the judiciary.

Sandlin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 472 (1995

Prisoner entitled to hearing on disciplinary proceedings could impact good or earned time.

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)

Probationer entitled to preliminary and revocation hearing.